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Most common law jurisdictions have adopted the provisions of the Statute of Frauds in some 
form which generally requires contracts for the sale of land to be in writing and signed by the 
party to be charged.  Although the applicable principles are relatively settled the increasing 
use of electronic methods in contract formation will necessitate a revisiting of these principles 
and their application to an electronic medium. The two primary questions in this regard are: 
• Whether an electronic document can be considered “in writing” for the purposes of 
the Statute of Frauds 
• Can an electronic signature affixed to an electronic contract serve the same functions 
as a manuscript signature for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds 
 
Is an electronic document “in writing”?  
Under the equivalent legislation to the Statute of Frauds in each state, a contract for the 
disposition of an interest in land will only be enforceable if the contract is” in writing” and 
signed by the party to be charged. The term is well understood to include paper and ink 
writings which have a physical form. The physical form satisfies the legislation’s original 
purpose of creating a permanent memorial of the bargain. The question in an electronic 
environment is whether something which may never take a physical form but could be 
permanently retained by the parties satisfies that same objective. The use of the phrase “in 
writing” will present difficulties for electronic contracts if it is determined that “in writing’ 
requires not only words but a physical presence. Little guidance can be obtained from the 
Australian decisions as no consideration is given in the existing authorities to the question of 
whether a document is in “writing” according to the Statute of Frauds. This fact is usually 
assumed as being obvious in the circumstances. As a general principle, the reported cases 
indicate that the courts will be satisfied where the contract between the parties has been 
reduced to a tangible form which can later be relied upon as a record of the bargain between 
the parties. Until recently, the only method used by most parties of reducing a document to 
tangible form has been the creation of a physical contract or some other printed version of the 
parties’ agreement. Obviously, the situation where a document is created on a computer and 
printed for execution does not present any significant jurisprudential issues. Once the 
document is printed it will be readily accepted as being in writing. The fact it was created 
using a computer and printer instead of a pen and ink will not prevent the printed document 
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from being considered writing. The difficulties arise, however, in stretching the current 
jurisprudence developed within a legal framework premised on the creation of physical 
documents, to a situation where an intangible electronic series of bits which convey no 
meaning without a computer and software to interpret has the same legal effect.  
 
No indication of the view an Australian Court may take can be found in reported decisions 
concerning the Statute of Frauds as little consideration has been given to the meaning of the 
phrase in “writing”. This fact is usually assumed as being obvious in the circumstances. 
However, in England evidence for the view that an electronic document which is visible on the 
computer screen is in writing is can be found in the interpretation of court rules providing for 
the service of a document by facsimile transmission.  For example, in Anson v Trump [1998] 1 
WLR 1404, the court held that a paper document required to be served as part of the litigation 
process could be served by facsimile transmission. The court recognised that between the 
time that the document was copied into the fax machine and the time that it was received in 
paper form at the recipient’s machine, it underwent a conversion which constituted the 
transmission process, and the fact that it remained in the facsimile machine’s memory in 
digital form before being printed or read was irrelevant. Similarly, in Lockheed–Arabia v Owen 
[1993] 3 All ER 641, Mann LJ was prepared to give the definition of writing in the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1978 (UK) an expansive meaning in accordance with technological change. 
His Lordship concluded that a photocopy was writing.  
 
Similar analogies have been drawn by the United States’ courts between sending a facsimile 
and sending an email. However while the analogy with a facsimile transmission may in some 
ways be valid, the main difference between the use of a fax and that of a computer is that a 
fax document needs to be printed in order to be read whereas a document on a computer 
does not. The electronic document may never be printed and therefore never take on a 
physical form. The fax is merely a conduit for transmitting a paper document from one place 
to another. In the case of a computer, the computer serves the additional function of actually 
creating the document which is then stored on the computer. 
 
In other contexts, United States Courts have also been willing to interpret legislative 
provisions widely to accommodate changes in business practices as a result of the advent of 
the computer age. For example, in Wilkens v Iowa Insurance Commissioner 457 NW 2d 1 
(Iowa 1990), the court held that a requirement to keep a written record of an insurance 
contract was satisfied by the insurer keeping records in its computer system. 
 
While come courts have appeared willing to stretch the common law view of what is writing 
some academic commentators have advanced the view that an electronic document is not 
writing because digital information is a series of electronic bits in a chip or some other 
recording medium and is not a visible representation or reproduction of words as required by 
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the definition of the Acts Interpretation Acts which defines writing as “any mode of 
representing or reproducing words in a visible form”. The argument being that as the 
emphasis of the Act is on visibility, an electronic document in its digital form does not qualify 
as writing. This view was rejected by the Law Commission for England and Wales (“Law 
Commission”) in their paper, “Electronic Commerce:  Formal Requirements in Commercial 
Transactions – Advice from the Law Commission”, stating that while an electronic document 
may not be in writing, the screen display will satisfy the definition of writing. The Commission 
refers by analogy to the cases involving faxes and telexes and discounts the criticism that 
electronic messages should be read.  In that respect, an electronic message is no different 
from a message contained in a document which could easily be delivered but not read.  The 
fact that it remained unread would not affect its validity. This is consistent with the view in the 
United States as stated above that a document which can be easily printed and stored is in 
writing.  
 
Do the Electronic Transactions Acts overcome the uncertainty? 
The Electronic Transactions Act in each State includes similar provisions for equating an 
electronic document to a paper document. By way of example s 11 of the Electronic 
Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001 (Qld) provides that a State law which requires the giving 
of information in writing may be satisfied by the giving of the information by way of an 
electronic communication. 
 
There are 3 requirements for section 11 to apply: 
• a State law requires the giving of information in writing; 
• the Information given must be readily accessible; and 
• the person to whom the information is given consents to the information being given 
electronically. 
The second and third requirements do not present any great difficulties provided the section 
actually has application to the Statute of Frauds. Crucial to an application of s 11 is that a 
State law “require the giving of information” in writing. 
 
Section 10 of the Queensland Act provides some examples of giving information (such as 
making or lodging a claim, giving sending or serving notification, lodging a return, making a 
request) but none of the examples given suggest that the expression “give information” 
includes the creation of a “contract or memorandum”. Hence the first difficulty with section 11 
(and its equivalents in other States) is whether section 11 would apply to the creation of a 
contract – it does not seem possible to paraphrase section 11 to read “If under a State law a 
person is required to [enter/form a contract] in writing”. The restriction to the ‘’giving of 
information” in s 11 appears to exclude the operation of the Act to situations where the 
requirement of writing relates to a contract rather than the notification of information to a 
person.  
 4
 
The second difficulty with the section is the use of the word “require”. Does section 59 actually 
require a contract or memorandum to be in writing? Section 59 simply provides that a contract 
will not be enforceable unless it is in writing, but it does not actually require that the contract 
be in writing. To overcome this problem, it is suggested that the word “require” would need to 
be broadly interpreted to include not only a positive obligation but also where a failure to 
comply will result in an invalid transaction. This interpretive approach would mirror the 
provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce which specifically provides 
that its writing provision applies whether the requirement is in the form of an obligation or 
whether the law simply provides consequences for the information not being in writing. 
 
 
3.  What type of electronic signature is a Signature for the Statute of Frauds? 
Very little judicial or academic comment exists to define a signature at common law although 
in some cases courts have accepted a range of signatures including crosses, initials, printed 
names and rubber stamps all by analogy with a written signature. Some Acts Interpretation 
Acts define “sign” as including “the attaching of a seal and the making of a mark”, but does 
not define signature.  An examination of the authorities indicates a concern to ensure that the 
function of requiring a signature is met by whatever method is used, but to date, the ordinary 
meaning of signature as being a mark on a written document has prevailed. 
The central issue for the validation of electronic signatures is whether they can perform the 
same functions and have the same security as a manuscript signature. In the context of a 
transaction subject to the Statute of Frauds this would require the signature to have the 
following characteristics:  
• it should be capable of being affixed to the electronic document and making a mark 
on the document; 
• it must indicate the party’s approval of the contents of the document; 
• it must be capable of identifying the party who has affixed the signature; 
• it must have the same quality of integrity as a written signature such that if the 
signature has been removed from the document, falsely affixed to the document, 
forged by another party or the contents of the document have been altered this could 
be easily established where the reliability of the document is called into question. 
 
It is evident from the number of statutes, orders and directives created within Australia, the 
United States and the European Union that the majority view is that not all types of electronic 
signatures will be able to fulfil the functions of a hand written signature. (See Digital 
Signatures Act 1995 (Utah); Digital Signature Act 1997 (Federal Republic of Germany); 
Electronic Records and Signatures Act 1997 (Massachusetts); Californian Government 
Code).  The Australian Electronic Commerce Expert Group considered that an electronic 
signatures in general would not satisfy all of the functions of a hand written signature and 
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therefore, legislation was required. Consistently with that view the Electronic Transactions 
Acts in each State provide for the satisfaction of a signature requirement by electronic means 
only in certain circumstances. Report of the Electronic Commerce Export Group is available 
at http://www.law.gov.au/aghome/advisory/eceg/ecegreport.html  
 
Do the Electronic Transactions Acts validate electronic signatures? 
Similarly to the approach with writing requirements the Electronic Transactions Act in each 
State provides that a requirement for a signature under a State law will be met for an 
electronic communication if certain requirements are met. The requirement are generally that 
the method used to sign the electronic document must: 
• identify the person and indicate their approval   
• be as reliable as was appropriate for the purposes for which the information was 
communicated 
and the person to whom the signature is requirement to be given consents to the method 
being used. 
 
The approach adopted in each of the Acts is consistent with the minimalist approach in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce and is effective to give recognition to 
electronic signatures but the flexibility of choice will not effectively safeguard consumers and 
may need to be restricted in certain types of transaction to specific types of signatures. No 
specific method is mandated leaving the choice of method to the parties. 
 
Although the deeming section in the relevant Electronic Transactions Act may have 
application to an electronic contract the central issue for a party agreeing to use an electronic 
method is whether the method is sufficiently reliable in the circumstances. The objectives of 
the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) in requiring a signature and the functions that the signature 
serves will be relevant to any consideration of reliability and appropriateness.  A crucial factor 
will be the ability of the signature method to authenticate the document and maintain the 
integrity of the document for later reference. 
 
This could be an area in which the court and the parties disagree with dire consequences for 
the validity of the agreement. It is suggested that the uncertainties created by this general 
approach need to be addressed through providing more specific criteria for the type of 
signature which will be effective, similarly with the approach in the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures or the European Union Electronic Signatures Directive. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Whilst the drafting of both the Commonwealth and State Electronic Transactions Acts appear 
to have achieved their initial purpose of facilitating the electronic submission of information to 
Government departments,  it is suggested that the State based Electronic Transactions 
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legislation does not provide sufficient certainty or integrity for land transactions subject to the 
Statute of Frauds provisions in each State. Further attention needs to be given to both the 
requirements of writing and signature in the context of land transactions either through 
amendment of the Electronic Transactions legislation or the passing of new legislation. 
 
The principal difficulties with the writing provision of the Electronic Transactions legislation 
stem from following the drafting style of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) which is 
focussed on the validity of notice and other government information and not contracts. The 
limiting nature of the phrase “give information” is recognised in the recent proposal by 
UNCITRAL for a proposed Model Law for Electronic Contracting due to the fact the existing 
Model Law for Electronic Commerce upon which the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) is 
based is considered inadequate. The specific difficulties raised in an electronic context by real 
estate transactions are mentioned by the working group. The further uncertainty of the word 
“require” also adopted from the Model Law for Electronic Commerce could also be overcome 
in the same way as the Electronic Transactions Act 2002 (NZ) where a specific section is 
devoted to legal requirements for documents to be “in writing”. 
 
As for electronic signatures, it is suggested that the two tier concept as used in the Electronic 
Signatures Directive or the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures is preferable 
because it allows for flexibility– the first tier can apply to any type of electronic signatures 
(similar to the UETA and Qld ETA definitions). However the second tier requires more 
stringent conditions to be fulfilled, and those conditions satisfy the functionalities required of a 
signature under the Statute of Frauds. Since the electronic signature provision in the 
Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) is based on the article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Electronic Commerce, one option for Australia would be to adopt the Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures. The Model Law through article 6 provides standards against which the 
technical reliability of electronic signatures may be measured without limiting the availability of 
the flexible criterion embodied in article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce. This option is currently being considered as part of a review by the Attorney 
General’s department of the UNCITRAL proposed Model Law on Electronic Contracting. 
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